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This slender volume contains the animals. Stephen R. L. Clark ar­
papers and (edited) discussions of a gues, in a somewhatWittgensteiniah 
July 1980 workshop. Small print fashion, that attributions of mental 
makes possible the inclusion of more states make sense only in the context 
content than the number of pages of behavioral criteria ahd that, 
would suggest. The editors' intro­ accordingly, we are fully justified in 
duction states that ascribing such states to nohhuman 
animals. D. M. Vowles and David 
[t] he aim [of the workshop] Bowsher report on interesting physio­
was to bri ng together people logical research-Vowles on neurophar­
from a variety of disciplines to macological .work that he believes may 
discuss the problems of defin­ point to "a rudimentary type of self­
ihg, describing and ihvestigat­ consciousness" in rats (20), and 
ing the concept of 'self' in Bowsher on recent studies of pain, 
animals, particularly farm ani­ most of which follow up on the impor­
mals (3). tant Melzack-Wall "gate-control" theory 
of pain (known to .many from Ronald 
In doing this, the workshop was an Melzack's eminently readable The 
evident success. The editors also tell Puzzle of Pain [New York: Basic 
us that the primary motivation in con­ Books, 1973] and Melzack's and Pat­
vening the workshop was the belief rick D. Wall's more recent The Chal­
that the experimental investigation of lenge of Pain [New York: Basic 
the mental lives of nonhuman animals Books, 1982]). Guy Woodruff pres­
"is a particularly important uhdertak­ ents intriguing results, obtained in 
ing in the context. of animal welfare" collaboration with David Premack, 
(ibid.). Here the' wOI'kshop was less concerning chimpanzee communication 
fruitful; little mention is made of and its bearing on chimpanzees' sense 
issues pertaining to the welfare of of self. (Those interested in the 
honhuman animals. The title of the work of Griffin, Woodruff, and Pre­
volume also occasions some disappoint­ mack will want to consult their arti­
ment: farm animals are not the topic cles, and the replies to them, in The 
of any of the papers, and only in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences I, 4 
second of two general discussions is [December 1978].) N. K. Humphrey 
more than passing attention explicitly defends the intriguing ethological 
given to them. speculation that the expressive behav­
ior of nonhuman animals is a reliable 
Nonetheless, the papers (and dis­ indicator of conscious feelings not 
cussions, which include comments from because such behavior and feelings 
the audience-largely of ethologists) are directly connected, but rather 
uhfailingly make for interesting read­ because both are independently corre­
ing. Donald R. Griffin argues that lated with the needs of animals that 
communication among nonhuman animals lead highly social lives and rely heav­
can provide important evidence about ily on intraspecies communication. 
the mental states of such animals, and Finally, Roger A. Mugford closes with 
he examines the ethological grounds some ethological observations about 
for attributing self-awareness to such dogs. 
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At several points, questions arise 
in the papers that one wishes the 
workshop participants had jointly pur­
sued in discussion. For example, 
Humphrey's argument that expressive 
behavior and mental states a rose as 
distinct reactions to common evolution­
ary pressures relies on his view that 
the only adaptive value consciousness 
has is to enable creatures to under­
stand and communicate with other 
members of their species. Clark, by 
contrast, advances the more radical 
view that conscious states have no 
adaptive val ue in terms of ution­evol 
ary biology (14). Clark also holds 
that ascriptions of mental states 
require a context of (possible) ex­
pressive behavior, and that claim con­
flicts with Humphrey's conclusion that 
mental states and expressive behavior 
are connected only by having both 
resulted from the same causal factors. 
It would have been useful if, in dis­
cussion, Clark and Humphrey had 
focused on the connection between the 
adaptive value of consciousness and 
the issue of how mental states and 
expressive behavior a re related. Is 
Clark's belief, e.g., in the evolution­
ary idleness of conscious states con­
nected with hisWittgensteinian view 
that we can ascribe mental states only 
against a background of expressive 
behavior? 
In his admirable study, The Ques­
tion of An/mal Awareness (New York: 
Rockefeller University Press, 1976; 
revised edition, 1981), Griffin has 
argued that conscious mental states do 
have adaptive val ue apart from expe­
diting social communication (1976: 84; 
1981: 144-5). Indeed, there and in 
the article cited above, he argues that 
the best explanation of complex 
behavior patterns of nonhuman animals 
is often that those animals are in con­
scious mental states. One wishes that 
he had, in discussion, joined issue 
with Clark and Humphrey. 
The participants often remark on 
the importance of distinguishing 
between awa reness and self-awa re­
ness, and of being sensitive to the 
spectrum of kinds of awareness that 
can occu r. But the question of 
whether a particular' kind of creature 
has self-awareness is usually dis­
cussed as though self-awareness were 
simply a special case of a creatu re' s 
being aware of things-the special case 
in which the creatu re itself is the 
object of its awa reness. So the evi­
dent "lack of agreement [among the 
participants] over the meaning of 
'self-awareness'" (46) tends to be 
treated as a disag reement about what 
kind of object one must be aware of to 
count as being aWare of one's self. It 
is likely that self-awareness is a more 
complex notion than that sort of 
approach suggests. To be self-aware, 
one must to some degree be aware of 
being in the mental states one is in, 
and that kind of awareness deserves 
independent, detailed discussion. 
Being aware of being in one's mental 
states is not merely a special case of 
being aware of one sort or another. 
If to be self-aware one must be 
aware of being in at least some of the 
mental states one is in, we must ask 
what it is for a mental state to be a 
conscious mental state. For the men­
tal states we count as conscIous are 
just those we are aware of being in. 
The workshop participants tend, how­
ever, not to distinguish between 'con­
scious' as it applies to mental states 
and 'conscious' as it applies to crea­
tures. The two notions are manifestly 
distinct: it is natural to count as con­
scious any animal that is awake and 
sentient, whereas it is clea rly more 
problematic what makes a mental state 
a conscious mental state. Failure to 
distinguish the two uses of 'conscious' 
can therefore lead to confusion about 
when to deem that consciousness IS 
present. 
Failure to distinguish the two uses 
can also make some claims 
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unnecessarily difficult to evaluate. 
For example, it would presumably be 
easier to discern the source of Clark's 
and Humphrey's doubts about the 
adaptive val ue of consciousness if the 
relevant passages in their papers dis­
tinguishedin a clear way between an 
organism's being conscious and 'its 
being ,in conscious mental states~i.e., 
mental states of whkhitis conscious. 
Moreover, unless one distinguishes 
between what it is for an organism to 
be conscious and what it is for a 
mental state to be conscious, one will 
be led to talk, as the participants 
often do, as thoiugh all mental states 
are automatically conscious states. 
But that cannot be correct, since we 
know that even humans are not always 
conscious of thei rmenlal states. 
These distinctions are important for 
assessing the relevance of self-aware­
ness to questions about the welfare of 
nonhuman animals-a connection that is 
perhaps more prohlematic than the 
editors suggest in their introduction. 
On the editors' view, self-awareness 
is important for considering such eth­
icalquestions because "it is almost 
impossible to imagine how any creatu re 
could su.ffer without being aware of 
itself suffering" (3). But the ability 
to be aware of oneself being in a 
mental state of whatever sort is a 
highly sophisticated matter, far more 
so than the mere ability to suffer. 
. (For clinical. results that bear on the 
complexities involved in such aware­
ness, see Bowsher's paper, or Mel­
tack, and Melzack and Wall, cited 
above.) Presumably it is suffering, 
t'ather than any form of self-awa re­
ness, that is primar'ily l'elevant to 
issues about the welfare of nonhuman 
animals, 
We shOUld not let the difficulty of 
imagining suffering without thereby 
imagining awareness of the suffering 
mislead us into thinking that such 
awareness invariably accompanies gen­
uine suffering. One cannot, in 
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general, imagine a mental state with­
out imagining that whatever creature 
is in that mental state is aware of 
being init.6'ut that is due not to 
the natu reof mental states, but to 
what itis to imagine something. 
There is , moreover, ada'ng'er that 
t'heidea that se'lf'-awareness automati­
cally accompan ies mental states can 
distort the way we thin kaboutethical 
issues. Many nonh uman animals 'evi­
denty have r'easonably richa'nde:lab­
orate mental Iives ,butsh6w little or 
no clear sign that they are aware that· 
they are in the mental states they are 
in, asopposed to their simply being 
in those menta!1 states. But, if no 
mental states can occu r without self­
awareness, one may be tempted, to 
doubt, or even-as Descartes did-to 
deny, that such an'imals have any 
mental states, properly so called. 
The dichotomy between self-aware 
mentality and mer'e biological re­
sponse, against Which Clark rightly 
Wa rns us (16), will thereby he rein­
forced. The 'idea that mental states 
are transparent to s'elf-'consciolfsness 
will thus have a manifestly destructive 
influence on the way We consid'er the 
welfare of nonhuman animals. 
Many species of nonhuman an ifna'ls 
have elaborate and complex ways of 
expressing their mental states. But 
we have how no clear evidence that 
any nonhuman species has a means of 
commu nication, natu ral to that spec­
ies, which enab'les its members to 
describe, as well as express, thei'r 
mental states. And it is unli kely that 
any other' sod of evidence can help 
us determine that a creature is actu­
ally aware that it IS in a particUlar 
mental state, as opposed to its simply 
being in that state, without also being 
aware that it is. Thus, although it 
may well be that many nonhuman ani­
mals are aware of being in the mental 
states they are in, it may also be 
markedly difficult to come by clear-cut 
evidence that they are. 
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There are weil- known studies, states. Moreover, we are evidently 
which help expandoLJr grasp of hOh.­- justified in taking apparent expres­-
human mentality, in which great apes sions of mental states at face value, 
hav!:! learned to use linguistic con­- as the workshop participants generally 
structiohS dev.ised by hurnahs. But do, whatever the merits may be· of 
care is heeded t6 interpret what the special theories, such as Clark's and 
apes say, all the rnore SO since they Humphrey's, about the connection 
are learning an alien form of communi­- between meritell states and expressive 
cation. HumariS often use mental idi­- behavior. (Descartes seems to have 
oms to describe wholly nonmental mat­- been clear about the need to distin­-
ters;· " . think it's raihihg' is typically guish between describing and ex­-
not about one's mental state, bUt pressing one's mental states. For he 
aboUt the weath1:lr. We woLild have to takes care to deny that tHe behavior 
be fairly confident that a creature has of nonhuman animals can even express 
a good command bf mental idioms mental states, and not rnerely tHat 
before tontlUdirig that it is telling us their' behavior cannot describe sLich 
about its mehtal states ~ states. ) These considerations suggest 
that it is wrong to stUdy corntnLJhica­-
BUt a creaturl:! clear-Iy tan have an tion in nonhumari species on the model 
elaborate array of mental states with­- of human language and, more geher­-
out being cible to describe them. ally, to .model nonhuman menti:llity dh 
AccbrdinsJly, it is rl:!elsonable to take the human capacity for self-aware­-
apparent expressions of mental states ness, as the workshop participants 
at .• f~cevaiUe, as . reliably iridicating tend to do. For to do So opens the 
tHepreseH~e of those states. . And. it way, howt:!ver unihteritidni3l1y; to an 
is reasonable to do so even when the· otHerwise Linwart'anted skepticism 
creatLlt'e-whether nonhuman or hu­- aboUt the ricHness of the ihi:!ntal lives 
man-caHriot describe those mental of nonhuman animals. 
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